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Article 5

COMMENTS

FEDERAL IMMUNITY-COURT

ORDER OR RUBBER STAMP

This note touches the history of federal immunity legislation and discusses
the interplay of the compulsory testimony acts and the constitutional privilege
against self-incrimination. To a limited extent it also attempts to answer some
ambiguities present in the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1954.1 1) what or where
is the controlling source of immunity power; 2) are there actually adverse litigants;
3) is the court requested to act in an advisory capacity, or to solve a political question; 4) does the court possess an absolute veto; 5) has the separation of powers
doctrine been abrogated?
The Privilege
The privilege against self-incrimination, contained in the Fifth Amendment,2
can be traced to the resistance offered by Englishmen to the ex officio oath administered in the Star Chamber Courts.' At an early date the privilege found its way
into the American Colonies and eventually became imbedded in our State Constitutions.' Though not mentioned in the Federal Constitution as originally drafted,

1 68 Star. 745 (1954), 18 U.S.C. § 3486 (Supp. II 1954). In order to halt the
overwhelming parade of witnesses invoking the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, Congress passed the Compulsory Testimony Act. "Senator McCarran's bill was
avowedly stimulated by the large number of witnesses before the Internal Security and
Un-American Activities committees who had invoked the privilege rather than answer
questions and accusations relating to communism." TAYLOR, GRAND INQUEST 218 (1955).
2 U.S. CONsT. AMEND. V: "nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness
against himself."
3 8 WIGMORE, EvIDENCE § 2250 (3d ed. 1940). Wigmore, The Privilege Against
Self-Crimination; It's History, 15 Harv. L. Rev. 610 (1902). Soon after the tyrannical reign
of Charles I (1629-1640), "In the early 1650's this privilege was so well established in the
customary law of England that it was never even thought necessary by an English Parliament
to pass an act or resolution touching the matter." Pittman, The Colonial and Constitutional
History of the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination Clause, 21 Va. L. Rev. 763, 774
(1935). For a detailed study of the history of the privilege see Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 1 (1930). Morgan,
The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 Minn. L. Rev. 1 (1949). Dean Griswold of
Harvard has said that the privilege is "one of the great landmarks in man's struggle to
make himself civilized." GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY, 7 (1955).
4 Pittman, supra note 2, at 775-83. Since the first ten amendments all the states of
the union have included the privilege in their constitutions except New Jersey and Iowa
where it became a part of their existing law: N.C. (1776), Pa. (1776), Va. (1776), Mass.
(1780), N.H. (1784). There are different theories propounded as to the origin and develop-

the privilege did appear in the Bill of Rights. As Justice Moody said, it was recognized, "as a privilege of great value, a protection to the innocent though a shelter
to the guilty, and a safeguard against unfounded or tyrannical prosecutions."5
Equally important is the concept expressed by Lord Chancellor Hardwicke that,
"the public has a right to every man's evidence and that no man can plead exemption from this duty to his country."6 In attempting to reconcile these traditional
policies Congress bartered immunity for compulsory testimony.
Federal Immunity Statutes
The first federal immunity statute dates back to 1857 when Congress was
probing the alleged corruptness of the House.7 To induce witnesses to testify
fully they were guaranteed protection against future prosecutions, and in effect
given immunity baths." In the first case involving the issues of self-incrimination
and an immunity statute the Court declared the Act unconstitutional, Justice
Bradley speaking for the majority announced:
Illegitimate and unconstitutional practices get their first footing in that way,
namely by silent approaches and slight deviations from legal modes of procedure. This can only be obviated by adhering to the rule that constitutional
provisions for the security of person and property should be liberally construed . . . and any compulsory discovery by extorting the party's oath . . . is
abhorrent to the instincts of an American. It may suit despotic power but it
cannot abide the pure atmosphere of political liberty and personal freedom. 9

ment of the privilege in the Colonies. See: Williams, Problems of the Fifth Amendment,
24 Ford. L. Rev. 19 (1955).
5 Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
6 12 COBBETT'S PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY 675, 693 (1742); quoted in 8 WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE § 2192 (3d ed. 1940). See also Brownell, Immunity From Prosecution Versus
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 27 Tul. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1953).
7 11 Stat. 155 (1857) amended 18 U.S.C. 3486 (Supp. 11 1954). For the subsequent
statutory history see United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 327 (1950).
1 Dixon, The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Geo. L.J. 447,
450 (1954). Congressman Wilson of Iowa remarked that "every day persons are offering
to testify before the investigating committees of the House in order to bring themselves
within the pardoning power of the Act of 1857." Cong. Globe, 37th Cong., 2nd Sess. 364
(1862).
9 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631, 632, 635 (1886). This section authorized
the court in revenue cases on motion by the Attorney General to require the claimant to
produce his private books, invoices and papers or else the Attorney's allegations were
to be taken as confessed. The Boyd case dealt with the fifth section of the Act of June 22,
1874 entitled an Act to amend the customs revenue laws. 15 Stat. 37 (1868) : "No testimony
given by a witness before either House, or before any committee of either House . . . shall
be used as evidence in any criminal prosecution against him in any court, except in a prosecution for perjury committed in giving such testimony." Note that the appellant's counsel
in remarking on compulsory self-incrimination said, "Itis the result of a long struggle
between the opposing forces of the spirit of individual liberty on the one hand and the
collective power of the state on the other." Others share this same view today. See GRISWOLD,
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY,

(1955).

Thereafter in Counselman v. Hitchcock,' ° a witness refused to answer questions
regarding a violation of the Interstate Commerce Acts. 1 The Court foresaw that
under the immunity Act of 18681" compelled testimony might serve as a lead to
other evidence which could be used in a future federal prosecution against Counselman. Holding § 86013 unconstitutional, the Court said, "the privilege is limited
to criminal matters but it is as broad as the mischief against which it seeks to
guard."' 4 Justice Blatchford declared that the protection must be coextensive with
the privilege 15 and ". . . a mere act of Congress cannot amend the Constitution."' "
Later the classic decision in Brown v. Walker 7 established that the privilege
can be asserted before a congressional committee and in federal courts but not in
state courts.'" Brown had refused to answer questions pertaining to railroad "kickback" practices and had invoked the privilege against self-incrimination. The
Court, found that the broad language of the Act'" insured absolute immunity
against prosecution. The case was a 5-4 decision and hinged on the narrow thread
of Justice Brown's logic that "if his testimony operate as a complete pardon for
the offence to which it relates . . . a statute absolutely securing to him such im-

'0

Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).

11 25 Stat. 855 (1887).
12 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
13 Section 860 was repealed by 36 Stat. 352 (1910); § 859 dealing with congressional
committees remained on the books until the present act.
14 Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, 562 (1892).
15 Id. at 585. ". . . (N) o statute which leaves the party or witness subject to prosecution after he answers the criminating question put to him, can have the effect of supplanting
the privilege conferred by the Constitution of the United States."
16 Id. at 565. It is very important to examine the almost identical language used by
Justice Galston in United States v. Ullmann, 221 F. 2nd 760, 763 (2nd Cir. 1955: "If this
matter were one of first impression I could easily reach the conclusion that the immunity
statute in question is in effect a circuitous attempt to circumvent the Constitution by a short
cut legislative statute amending the Fifth Amendment."
17 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). This case also involved the Interstate
Commerce Commission. Congress in 1893 had hurriedly passed anoher immunity statute
following the Counselman decision. 27 Star. 443 (1893), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1953).
18 This restriction has been closely followed for some sixty years. For a listing of the
various acts incorporating the Brown language see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1, 6
n.4 (1948). See also United States v. James, 60 Fed. 257 (7th Cir. 1894), where the
district court of Illinois had overruled the new statute basing its opinion on a broad interpretation of Counselman v. Hitchcock.
19 27 Stat. 443 (1896), 49 U.S.C. § 46 (1953): "No person shall be excused from
attending and testifying or from producing books, paper, tariffs, contracts, agreements and
documents before the Interstate Commerce Commission, or in obedience to the subpoena of
the Commission ... or in any cause or proceeding, criminal or otherwise, based upon a growing out of any alleged violation of the act of Congress, entitled, "An act to regulate commerce"
. . on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence, documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture.
But no person shall be prosecuted or subject to any penalty or forefeiture for or on account
of any transaction, matter nor thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence,
documentary or otherwise, before said Commission, or in obedience to its subpoena . . . or
in any such case or proceeding: Provided, That no person so testifying shall be exempt
from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying."

munity from prosecution would satisfy the demand of the clause in question."2
The serious question of state prosecution was adeptly waived away with a sweeping
sentence when Justice Brown quoting from Queen v. Boyes said, that it was "a
danger of an imaginary and unsubstantial character, having reference to some
extraordinary and barely possible contingency, so improbable that no reasonable
man would suffer it to influence his conduct."' 21 The extra-legal aspects of the
statute such as public opprobrium and defamation were held not to be controlling.
And securing immunity to third persons was shelved for fear of extending the
22
Counselman decision.
Brown v. Walker Re-Examined

Many thought that the Compulsory Testimony Act of 1954 was literally constitutional, while others gave various grounds for doubting its constitutionality. 23 In

20 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 595 (1896). The same stand is taken by Whelan,
Punishment For Crimes: The Supreme Court and the Constitution, 35 Minn. L. Rev. 109,
152 (1951). But see Ullman v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 437 (1956). Justice Frankfurter made note of James C. Carter leader of the American bar who presented appellant's
arguments in Counselman v. Hitchcock. Carter stated that the immunity statute was an attempt to exercise the power of pardon which was not a power delegated to Congress. Note
also the words of Justice Field dissenting in the Brown case. "Congress cannot grant a
pardon. That is an act of grace which can only be performed by the President." See
also Holmes' decision in Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 142, (1913): "Of course
there is a clear distinction between an amnesty and the Constitutional protection of a party
from prosecution and punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
21 Queen v. Boyes, 1 B & S 311 (1861).
22 Brown v. Walker, supra at 610 and 628. Justices Field, Gray, White and Shiras
dissented, and with acute foresight anticipated some of the difficulties involved in the present
immunity act. Since Brown v. Walker only seven cases dealing with immunity statutes have
been before the Supreme Court. Jack v. State of Kansas, 109 U.S. 372 (1905), held that
possible incrimination under a Kansas Anti-Trust law was not a bar to federal prosecution
for the testimony so compelled. Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131 (1913), decided that
immunity did not extend to corporate records which the witness could have been compelled
to produce without such an immunity statute. In United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424
(1943), the Court said that a witness appearing before a grand jury did not have to invoke
the privilege against self-incrimination as he already had that protection under the immunity act of 1893. Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), held that testimony
compelled under a state immunity statute could be introduced in a federal criminal prosecution without depriving defendant of the privilege. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1
(1948), presented a problem similar to the one in the Heike case, supra, and the Court
disposed of the case by relying on the rationale of the earlier decision, coupled with a reference to the public's interest in the corporate records. In Smith v. United States, 337 U.S. 137
(1949), a subpoenaed witness was held to be immune from prosecution based on his testimony when he claimed the privilege at the outset before answering any questions. Finally
in Adams v. State of Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954), the Court held constitutional a federal
statute precluding the use in a state prosecution testimony previously compelled before a
congressional committee. The Court rejected the interpretation that "in any court" referred to
the Federal Judiciary.
23 For a treatment of the defects and criticism of the immunity statute see TAYLOR,
GRAND INQUEST, 215-221, 296-300 (1955), GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY

80-81 (1955), Dixon The Fifth Amendment and Federal Immunity Statutes, 22 Geo. Wash.
L. Rev. 447, 554 (1953-54), Dixon, The Doctrine of Separation of Powers and Federal
Immunity Statutes 23 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 501, 627 (1954-55), Boudin, The Immunity
Bill, 42 Geo. L.J. 497 (1953-54). For a view upholding the immunity act see Hofstadter,

United States v. Ullmann2 the Supreme Court was faced with re-examining Brown
v. Walker "in the light of new circumstances which have arisen." 2 The proceedings concerned only the grand jury and fell under subsection (c) of the Act.2" By
a 7-2 decision the Court found that the immunity granted was equivalent to the
constitutional guarantee. Speaking for the Court Justice Frankfurter broke Ullmann's
main contentions into four questions: 1) Is the immunity provided by the Act
sufficiently broad to displace the protection afforded by the privilege against selfincrimination? Answering affirmatively the Court relied on its earlier decision in
Brown v. Walker where a similar statute guaranteeing absolute immunity from
federal prosecution was upheld as an adequate substitute for the privilege. 27 2)
Assuming that the statutory requirements are met, does the Act give the district
judge discretion to deny an application for an order requiring a witness to answer
relevant questions put by the grand jury, and, if so, is the Court thereby required
to exercise a function that is not an exercise of "judicial power"? Literally, the
function of the district court judge does not involve any discretion: subsection (c)
merely requires that "upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused

THE FIFTH AMENDMENT AND THE IMMUNITY ACT OF

1954, The Record of the Associa-

tion of the Bar of the City of New York, 453 (Dec. 1955).
24

Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422 (1956). The defendant, a former Treasury

Department employee, upon being subpoenaed before a federal grand jury refused to answer
certain questions involving national security on grounds of self-incrimination under the
Fifth Amendment. The United States Attorney pursuant to 68 Star. 745, felt that the testimony was for the public interest presented the order to the district court which reviewed
the order and granted the immunity preventing the obtained testimony from being used
against the defendant in any criminal proceeding in any court, and directed the witness
to answer the questions put forth. Defendant claimed that the immunity was not as broad
as the privilege and that the Act was unconstitutional, violating the separation of powers
doctrine.
25 United States v. Ullmann, 221 F. 2nd 760 (1955).
26 "(c)
Whenever in the judgment of a United States attorney the testimony of any
witness, or the production of books, papers, or other evidence by any witness, in any case
or proceeding before any grand jury or court of the United States involving any interference
with or endangering of, or any plans or attempts to interfere with or endanger, the national
security or defense of the United States by treason, sabotage, espionage, sedition, seditious
conspiracy, violations of Chapter 115 of title 18 of the United States Code, violations of the
Internal Security Act of 1950 (64 Stat. 987), violations of the Atomic Energy Act of
1946 (60 Star. 755), as amended, violations of sections 212 (a), (27), (28), or
(29) or 241 (a) (6), (7) or 313 (a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (66 Stat.
182-186; 204-241, and conspiracies involving any of the foregoing, is necessary to the
public interest, he, upon the approval of the Attorney General, shall make application
to the court that the witness shall be instructed to testify or produce evidence subject to the
provisions of this section, and upon order of the court such witness shall not be excused
from testifying of from producing books, papers, or other evidence on the ground that the
testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to a
penalty or forfeiture. But no such witness shall be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty
or forfeiture for or on account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is
compelled, after having claimed his privilege against self-incrimination, to testify or produce
evidence, nor shall testimony so compelled be used as evidence in any criminal proceeding
(except prosecution described in subsection (d) hereof) against him in any court." 18 U.S.C.
§ 3486 (Supp. II 1954).
27 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 610 (1896). "While the constitutional provision

in question is justly regarded as one of the most valuable prerogatives of the citizen, its
object is fully accomplished by the statutory immunity, and we are, therefore, of opinion
that the witness was compellable to answer."

from testifying."2' The court is not asked to act beyond the scope of its judicial
29
powers; hence the separation of powers doctrine is not abrogated. 3) Did Congress provide immunity from state prosecution for crime, and if so, is it empowered
to do so? Earlier"0 the Court said compelled testimony was inadmissable in state
or federal prosecutions. Here the Court found that Congress went further by barring
any prosecution involving compelled testimony.8 Even though less immunity
would be a sufficient substitute for the privilege, the extended protection is desirable and does not exceed constitutional limitations on federal activities. It is justified as a reasonable method for discharging its duty to provide for national security. 2 4) Does the Fifth Amendment prohibit compulsion of what would otherwise be self-incriminating testimony no matter what the scope of the immunity
statute? The Court refused to overrule Brown v. Walker 8 and declared that the
1893 statute has become completely enmeshed in our constitutional fabric. Justice
Douglas, dissenting, took the position that the Fifth Amendment granted a right
of silence "beyond the reach of government":
It is no answer to say that a witness who exercises his Fifth Amendment right
of silence and stands mute may bring himself into disrepute. If so, that is the
price he pays for exercising the right of silence granted by the Fifth Amendment s.4 . . the Fifth Amendment stands between the citizen and his government.

(M)ay be issued by the district court judge." 68 Stat. 745, 18 U.S.C. § 3486
28 "...
(Supp. 11 1954).
29 Following its traditional policy, the Court did not decide whether subsection (c)
would be constitutional as requiring an exercise or discretion. United States v. Ullmann,
supra at 431, 432. See p. 456 for discussion of subsection (a) and (b). The Court agreed
with Judge Weinfeld's interpretation that "The Supreme Court has repeatedly warned if a
serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this court will first
ascertain whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
avoided." United States v. Ullmann, supra.
30 There was some doubt, however, as evidenced by the Report of the Committee on
the Judiciary of the House of Representatives: "Even though the power of Congress to prohibit a subsequent State prosecution is doubtful, such a constitutional question should not
prevent the enactment of the recommended bill." H.R. Rep. No. 2606, 83d Cong., 2d Sess.
7 (1954). The Attorney General had expressed the same viewpoint. Brownell. Immunity
From Prosecutionversus Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 28 Tulane L. Rev. 1 (1953-54).
I" Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954). But a conviction might be sustained on
other evidence . . .
82 U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 8. In an analagous case the Federal Smith Act was held to
preclude state prosecutions under the Pennsylvania Sedition Act. Pennsylvania v. Nelson,
350 U.S. 497 (1956).
88 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). Here the Court upheld the constitutionality
of a statute which provided complete immunity against federal prosecution. See footnote
17 supra.
34 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 454 (1956). On the right to silence see,
Drinan S.J., The Right to Silence, 95 No. 4 America 106 (April 1956); For an excellent

Subsections (a) and (b)
The congressional committee has a right to conduct an appropriate investigation"s but it must scrupulously observe the Fifth Amendment."6 Under subsection
(a) when a witness claims his privilege,3 7 applicable to federal civil cases 8 and
grand jury proceedings, 35 in a legislative hearing, upon the application of an authorized Representative of Congress, the district court may issue an order compelling the witness to testify. Before immunity is granted, however, the Attorney
General must be notified and given an opportunity to be heard by the Court. Thus
the problem is whether legislative and judicial functions are now vested in different
branches of the federal government. It is true, there have been inroads upon this
constitutional absolute such as the so-called "quasi-legislative" bodies (like the ICC,
FTC, CAB, SEC, AEC, et al.) and legislative courts. The legislative history of
this immunity Act definitely indicates that the makers were in a quandary as to
where the immunizing power should lie.4" Two possible theories can be used to
describe the process of allowing the district court to approve the grant of immunity.
1) The immunity is either given by the Committee subject to the veto power of
the court or 2) it is given by the court on application of the committee. This can
be further reduced to two simple hypotheses. The immunity is either a "court
approval" or a "court order." Since Article III vests the judicial power in the
Supreme Court "and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time
ordain and establish,"'" the judiciary can examine only cases and controversies.4" For a case and controversy there must be adverse litigants, 43 yet ex parte
proceedings may fall within this category, and naturalization has been recognized
44
as a "case."

discussion see Problems of the Fifth Amendment in Modern Times, Connery S.J., The Right
to Silence, 30 Marq. L. Roy. 180 (1955-56), GRISWOLD, THE FIFTH AMENDMENT TODAY,
id. at 191, Williams, The Fifth Amendment in Non-Criminal Proceedings, id at 205.
35 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927), Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S.
263 (1929), In Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
36 Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951).
37

For the view of one author who argued that because an immunity statute could

validly compel testimony before a grand jury or regulatory agency it does not follow a congressional committee can exercise similar compulsion. See Boudin, The Immunity Bill, 42
Geo. L. J. 497, 511-512 (1953-54). There seems to be no clear authority in the States, 87
A.L.R. 435 (1935) but see In Re Doyle, 257 N.Y. 224, 264 Mr. Justice Cardoza saying,
"The power to immunize from prosecution is a sovereign legislative power."
38 McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924).

.9 United States v. Ullmann, 350 U.S. 422 (1956), Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S.
547 (1892), United States v. Monia, 317 U.S. 424 (1943),Hale v. Henkel, 210 U.S.

43 (1906), Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
40 For the debates on the vesting of immunity power in the Congress see 99 Cong.
Rec. 4737-43, 8340-57 (1953).
41 U.S. CONsT. Art. III, § 1.
42 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
43 Ibid.
44 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).

In the Ullmann case Justice Frankfurter cited Interstate Commerce Commission
v. Brimson" to the effect that the proceedings met the statutory requirement under
subsection (c). Finality, however, must lie in the district court.4 1 It is possible
then, that if the language of subsection (a) of the Act 4 7 is interpreted as forcing
the court to act in a discretionary capacity they would possess an absolute veto
power. This is substantially different from subsection (c) in that the language
used there indicated that the court will not look into the order but that if it meets
the statutory requirements they shall grant it.
The question of adverse litigants is partially solved because the witness has
to claim his privilege first. A different situation arises if the witness is not included
as an adverse party. The non-adversary character of the proceedings would then
involve the Attorney General, the Committee and the Court. It is theoretically
possible for the Attorney General to thwart the congressional intent by desiring
certain matters of national security to remain secret while the committee wishes
to bare them. If this situation arose it appears that the court is acting in an arbiter's
role, electing between the Attorney General and Committee-a dispute between
the legislative and executive branches without the faintest indicia of a legal issue.
It is quite dubious that the court could be called upon to do this since they have
consistently frowned upon answering political questions.48
If the Act is read as it was in the Ullmann case, the court merely grants the
order, but this is unique also. When the witness has been properly subpoenaed
before the committee, invokes the privilege and is granted immunity he answers
only to that which the order requires. Nowhere in the Act is the scope of the order
explained. If it is too narrow probably the whole mechanical process of gathering
information will be a cumbersome hodgepodge of running between the court and
the committee for new grants of immunity with each new series of questions propounded. If not, then the court order may be very broad, so extensive in fact that
the witness may "white wash" his past sins in a glorious rapprochement of the
1857 immunity bath fiasco. In summary it is highly improbable that subsections
(a) and (b) will get the same treatment as subsection (c) received in the
Ullmann decision. Rather, it is conjectured that the coup de grace will fall upon
subsections (a) and (b) of the Act.
MORGAN D. DoWD

45 Interstate Commerce Commission v. Brimson,
46

Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (U.S. 1792).

47

See footnote 28.

48

Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).

154 U.S. 447 (1894).

